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Abstract 
 
This article discusses the approaches to first-party insurance bad-faith law that 
have been taken by the states, using legal and economic reasoning to illuminate 
the potential benefits and costs of different approaches. Theory suggests that 
allowing policyholders to recover damages over and above the value of the 
insurance benefit owed will provide insurers with added incentives to engage in 
fair claims settlement. However, excessive or uncertain liability for insurance bad 
faith might create incentives for policyholders to file questionable claims and 
disincentives for insurers to investigate claims for fraud. The article analyzes a 
large dataset of first-party automobile insurance claims to investigate whether 
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these adverse effects appear to have empirical relevance. The data show that claim 
characteristics in states that permit tort-based bad faith differ from those in other 
states. The findings are consistent with the idea that permitting tort-based first-
party insurance bad-faith settlements might reduce insurer incentives to challenge 
disputable claims.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
  Historically, insurers were not penalized under common law for unfair claim 
settlement practices including, for example, unnecessarily delaying the payment of 
a policy benefit or withholding payment of a rightful policy benefit.
3  U n d e r  
traditional common-law rules,
4 a policyholder was allowed to recover only those 
damages that were in the contemplation of the parties to the contract at the time 
the policy was purchased. This meant that damage awards could not exceed the 
amount specified in the insurance policy. Even if the breach of contract was 
intentional on the part of the insurer, the policyholder was not entitled to 
prejudgment interest on the amount due under the policy, legal expenses incurred 
in pursuing a breach of contract remedy, or consequential (incidental) damages for 
economic loss and mental distress. With perhaps the exception of large 
commercial insureds, this legal structure provided little incentive for most 
policyholders to challenge an insurer over an unpaid claim. 
  In the early 1900s, state legislatures began to respond to this situation by 
enacting statutes that provided for the recovery of prejudgment interest and legal 
expenses in those cases where the insurer acted unreasonably in the processing of 
a claim. While enactment of these statutes constituted the first recognition that an 
imbalance existed, only about one-fourth of the states had enacted statutes 
providing for prejudgment interest and legal expenses as late as 1951. However, 
by 1959, all states had adopted the model Unfair Trade Practices Act developed 
and promulgated by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC). This model act primarily addressed the marketing practices of insurers, 
and it was not until 1972 that an amendment pertaining to unfair claim settlement 
practices was incorporated into the model legislation. This model legislation, or 
some variant of it, has been adopted by all states. 
  The Unfair Trade Practices Act prohibits certain acts by an insurer only when 
committed flagrantly and in conscious disregard of the statute, or with such 
frequency as to indicate a general business practice. Prohibited acts include, for 
example, knowingly misrepresenting to insureds policy provisions relating to 
coverage at issue; failing to acknowledge promptly a communication from a 
policyholder relating to a claim; failing to adopt and implement reasonable 
                                                 
3. This historical perspective concerning the evolution of bad faith law is based on Stempel 
(2008). 
4. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). 
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standards for the prompt investigation and settlement of claims; and not attempting 
in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlement of submitted 
claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.
5 
  The model legislation was silent as to whether it creates a private cause of 
action. This meant that the insured’s only recourse was to file a complaint with the 
state insurance department. Given that the insured could not file a suit for 
monetary damages, hiring an attorney and compelling discovery to obtain proof 
that the insurer had “flagrantly, and in conscious disregard of the statute 
committed a prohibited act” was often not practical.
6 In the absence of such proof, 
state insurance departments were unlikely to undertake remedial action unless 
numerous, similar complaints were received that indicated the prohibited act was 
being committed by the insurer with such frequency as to indicate a general 
business practice. 
  To strengthen the position of insureds and further deter insurer misconduct, 
courts and state legislatures across the country began to allow the filing of private 
causes of action against insurers alleging unfair claim settlement practices. This 
move was based on the “private attorney general” concept, which holds that 
insureds are in the best position to police the insurance industry with respect to 
unfair claim settlement practices. The ability of the insured to obtain 
compensatory damages (including consequential, or incidental, damages for 
economic loss and mental distress) created an incentive for policyholders who 
believed they were treated unfairly to bring lawsuits against insurers. 
  Today, many states allow for recovery of consequential or incidental 
damages, attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest, as well as the benefit owed 
under the policy, in a first-party insurance bad-faith case. Indeed, a majority of 
states that recognize insurance first-party bad-faith liability allow actions under 
tort law rather than contract law, despite the existence of a contract and without 
requiring the policyholder to allege a traditional tort, such as fraud or intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. Moreover, in recent years, many state legislatures 
have enacted, or considered enacting, legislation that creates or expands the legal 
avenues available to policyholders to pursue actions against their insurers for bad 
faith in claims settlement (GenRe, 2008). 
  This article discusses the approaches to first-party insurance bad-faith law that 
have been taken by the states, using legal and economic reasoning to illuminate 
the potential benefits and costs of different approaches. Theory suggests that 
allowing policyholders to recover damages over and above the value of the 
insurance benefit owed will provide insurers with added incentives to engage in 
fair claims settlement, and that this might enhance the efficiency of contracting in 
insurance markets. However, theory also identifies a number of potential adverse 
                                                 
5. For an identification of all 14 of the prohibited acts, see, e.g., Laureen Regan and Paul M. 
Rettinger, “Private Rights of Action Under State Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Acts,” 
Journal of Insurance Regulation, Spring 1998, pp. 296–297. 
6. This language, or the functional equivalent of it, is contained in the Unfair Claims 
Practices Act that has been adopted in all states. See, for example, Cal. Ins. Code Section 
790.03(h)(s), (h)(14)(West 2006)(California Unfair Claims Practices Act). 
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effects of excessive or uncertain tort liability for insurance bad faith, most notably 
the creation of incentives for fraudulent claiming and the creation of disincentives 
for insurers to investigate claims that are potentially fraudulent. The article 
analyzes a large dataset of automobile insurance claims to investigate whether 
these latter effects appear to be of empirical relevance. The empirical evidence is 
consistent with the idea that permitting tort-based first-party insurance bad-faith 
settlements might change claim-filing and claim-investigation incentives in the 
manner predicted by theory.  
 
 
Legal Standards for First-Party Bad-Faith 
Liability 
  
  The states have adopted varying standards for determining insurer bad faith in 
first-party claims settlements. Specifically, courts and state legislatures across the 
country have adopted three distinct procedures and standards to facilitate the filing 
of private causes alleging unfair claims-settlement practices.
7 
 
Tort Action Based Solely on Bad Faith 
  
  Today, a majority of jurisdictions permit a tort action based solely on breach 
of the implied covenant of utmost good faith (i.e., bad faith). Policyholders are not 
required to allege an independent tort—such as fraud or intentional infliction of 
emotional distress—in order to recover under tort laws. The general rule of 
damages in tort is that the injured party may recover for all harm or injuries 
incurred, regardless of whether they could have been anticipated. Assuming that 
the conduct giving rise to liability was particularly egregious, punitive damages 
may be awarded.  
  Among jurisdictions that permit a tort action based solely on bad faith, at least 
12 have adopted a “negligence” standard for determining whether an insurer has 
acted in bad faith. Courts following this approach have reasoned that insurers must 
be held to a high standard because of their disproportionate ability to cause severe 
economic dislocation to a policyholder (e.g., a policyholder might be forced to file 
for bankruptcy as result of the unreasonable denial of a property insurance claim, 
or as a result of the unnecessary delay in the payment of a property insurance 
claim). This standard demands that an insurer not withhold unreasonably payment 
due under a policy (i.e., an insurer must have proper cause to deny payment for a 
claim submitted under a policy). 
  At least 16 jurisdictions have adopted an “intentional tort” standard. Under 
this standard, an insurer is entitled to contest a claim so long as it has a reasonable 
basis grounded in law or fact. Whether the insurer ultimately is correct in its 
                                                 
7. For further details, see Stempel (2008), pp. 10–101. 
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position is of no consequence in resolving the bad-faith issue. Denying a claim 
whose validity is “fairly debatable” does not constitute bad faith. Under this 
standard, “the tort of bad faith is not a tortious breach of contract. It is a separate 
intentional wrong that results from a breach of duty imposed as a consequence of 
the relationship established by contract.”
8  
  One state (Arkansas) has adopted a “quasi-criminal” standard. In adopting this 
standard, the court declared that “evidence of bad faith must be sufficient to show 
affirmative misconduct of a nature which is malicious, dishonest, or oppressive.”
9 
 
Contract Action with Broad Definition of Damages 
   At least nine states confine the good-faith/bad-faith inquiry to the realm of 
contract, but broadly define damages to include both general damages (i.e., those 
following naturally from the breach) and consequential, or incidental, damages 
(i.e., those reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, 
the parties at the time the contract was made).
10 Consequential damages may reach 
beyond the strict contract terms and include prejudgment interest and legal 
expenses, and damages for economic loss and mental distress. An independent 
tort, such as fraud or intentional infliction of emotional distress, must be alleged in 
order to make a claim for punitive damages.  
 
Statute 
  At least 25 states recognize the right to file a private cause of action alleging 
bad faith based on a statute and judicial recognition of an implied, private cause of 
action under an Unfair Trade Practices Act that includes an unfair claims-
settlement practices provision.
11 Damages may include prejudgment interest and 
legal expenses, consequential, or incidental, damages for economic loss and 
mental distress, and, in some instances, punitive damages.     
  There is considerable variation among statutes with respect to the standard of 
conduct, burden of proof and damages that can be recovered. Some statutes, for 
example, only allow for limited recovery of damages (e.g., prejudgment interest 
and attorney fees).
12  Other statutes contain language that has been broadly 
construed by courts to permit unlimited punitive damages in those cases where the 
                                                 
8. See Anderson v. Continental Insurance Company, 85 Wis. 2d 675, 691, 271 N.W. 2d 368 
(1978). 
9. See Aetna Casualty and Surety v. Broadway Arms, 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W. 2d 463 
(1984). 
10. The nine states include Delaware, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
York, Oregon, Utah and Virginia. 
11. The 25 states include Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, 
Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, 
Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, 
Texas, West Virginia and Washington. 
12. See, e.g., MCL 500.3148 (1) Section 6.29 and 6.30 (Michigan). 
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insurer has engaged in more than one listed prohibited practice with respect to the 
processing of a single claim.
13   
  Moreover, the statutory basis for first-party insurance bad faith is still 
evolving.  In recent years, a number of states have enacted, or considered enacting, 
new legislation that creates a substantial first-party bad-faith liability exposure for 
insurers. For example, Minnesota passed legislation in 2008
14 that creates a new 
private cause of action for first-party insurance bad faith where one previously did 
not exist. The statute codifies the intentional tort standard and specifically 
precludes the possibility of punitive damages in the absence of an independent 
tort, such as fraud or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Recent Colorado 
legislation
15 adopts the negligence standard, whereas the intentional tort standard 
previously applied under common law. The new legislation allows for the 
recovery of the cost of litigation, but caps damages awards at two times the policy 
benefit that was unreasonably denied.
16 Legislation adopted in Washington
17 
expands the definition of first-party insurance bad faith and increases the damages 
awards available to policyholders in cases alleging insurer bad faith. 
 
 
Incentive Effects of First-Party Bad-Faith 
Liability 
 
  Allowing the courts to impose extra-contractual liability on insurers in cases 
of intentional or unintentional bad-faith denial of claims not only serves the 
obvious purpose of compensating policyholders for their unwarranted losses, but 
also may serve the broader economic purpose of enhancing the efficiency of 
insurance contracting. Competitive markets will work to constrain insurers from 
unwarranted systematic bad faith in settlement activities, due to reputation 
penalties that will reduce demand for insurance from a company that engages in 
such practices. However, competition alone might not guarantee that insurers will 
never engage in bad-faith practices.  
  Intentional bad faith might occur, for example, if an insurer strategically 
denies or delays the settlement of a particularly large insurance claim for the 
purpose of coercing the policyholder to accept a reduced claim settlement. Market 
sanctions might not deter this kind of behavior, because the potential cost-savings 
on the claim could outweigh the cost of reputation penalties meted out in the 
market in the form of reduced demand for insurance. The possibility of bad faith 
                                                 
13. See e.g., Maher v. Continental Casualty Company, 76 F. 3d 535 (4
th Cir. 1999) 
(Applying West Virginia law.) 
14. 2008 Minn. Laws § 604.18. 
15. Colorado Rev. Stat. Aon. § 10-3-1113 (2008). 
16. Moreover, the new legislation imposes a special penalty on health insurers that 
unreasonably delay the payment of the policy benefit (i.e., the penalty is 20 percent of the policy 
benefit, the payment of which was delayed 90 days or longer past the submission of the claim). 
17. Wash. Rev Code § 48.30.010 (2007). 
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might help to commit insurers to avoid engaging in unwarranted claims denials by 
imposing a direct financial penalty for doing so (Sykes, 1996; Abraham, 1986). 
Such particularly is the case if damages awards are large in the event that a court 
finds in favor of the policyholder. The threat of extra-contractual liability will 
reduce the incentives of an insurer to deny, delay or underpay claims. Thus, 
insurer liability for bad faith in claims settlement might reassure consumers that 
valid claims will be paid, and this assurance will improve the insurance-
contracting environment. 
  There are also circumstances in which insurers might engage in claims-
settlement behaviors that lead to an unintentional bad-faith denial of settlement 
(see Sykes, 1996).  Incomplete contracts and contractual complexity might lead to 
disputes regarding the compensability of a claim. One situation is when an insurer 
and a policyholder have different information about the circumstances of a loss 
that lead to differing conclusions about the value of the loss or whether the loss is 
covered by the insurance policy.  Another case involves the potentially fraudulent 
or exaggerated claim, in which the insurer believes that the policyholder might 
have manufactured false information about the loss event or the amount of loss. 
Other contractual disputes involve differing interpretations of the language of the 
insurance policy by the insurer and the policyholder, leading to different beliefs 
about whether a loss should be covered.  Disputes of these kinds between an 
insurer and a policyholder might result in claim denials or other claim-settlement 
behaviors that prove to be unwarranted in the eyes of an independent observer, 
such as the courts. 
  Claim investigations are an important tool that insurers have for preventing 
excessive claim payments or payment of illegitimate claims. An investigation can 
benefit the insurer if it results in claim denial or a reduction in claim payment, but 
the investigation process itself might lead to claim delays and other insurer actions 
that bring accusations of bad faith. Because investigating claims is costly, insurers 
will balance the expected gains from investigation against the costs. In the absence 
of potential extra-contractual liability, the insurer considers only the benefits of 
claims denial or underpayment, in terms of reduced claims costs and reduced 
fraud.  The insurer does not have an incentive to take into account the costs 
imposed on (legitimate) policyholders from its investigation strategy. However, if 
faced with the possibility of damages awards in excess of the insurance claim 
amount, the insurer is given appropriate incentives to take into account the costs to 
policyholders associated with claim investigations and payment delays. When 
deciding on a claims-investigation strategy, insurers will balance the benefits of 
reduced costs with the costs of investigation, including the expected costs of 
litigation. This internalizes the externality, because the insurer realizes the benefits 
and the costs of its claims-investigation strategy (Crocker and Tennyson, 2002).   
  While tort actions to address insurer bad faith in claims settlement might be 
beneficial in theory, their implementation in law has important implications for 
whether the system is, in fact, producing those benefits. If the standards applied in 
the courts for a finding of insurer bad faith are too lax, and/or if damage awards 
© 2009 National Association of Insurance Commissioners
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are too high relative to the actual costs incurred by policyholders whose claims 
have been denied, substantial incentive distortions might arise. 
  A major concern is the increased pressure on insurers to pay disputable claims 
(Abraham, 1986). We have discussed the fact that insurers balance the benefits of 
reduced fraud costs with the expected costs of litigation. If the expected costs of 
litigation to insurers from disputed claims exceed the expected cost savings from 
reducing fraud, insurers will have too little incentive to employ fraud-screening 
and deterrence strategies. Excessive liability will raise the costs of investigation 
and reduce investigations below what they should be. This will raise the costs of 
fraud in the immediate term, because fewer fraudulent claims will be detected, and 
over the longer term, because of reduced deterrence. By reducing insurer 
resistance to fraudulent claims and by increasing the payoffs from litigation, 
excessive liability for insurer bad faith will increase consumers’ incentives to 
engage in claims fraud and exaggeration. Another potential problem is the 
increased incentive for policyholders to engage in litigation against insurers for 
bad-faith handling of a claim, even if the policyholder knows the claim is invalid 
(Abraham, 1986). 
  If, in addition, the standard for a finding of insurer bad faith is unclear, 
changing or prone to error, this can lead insurers to over-invest in avoidance of 
claim disputes (Shavell, 1987). This will lead to further pressures on insurers to 
pay disputable claims, with the resulting increase in consumer incentives for 
claims fraud described above. It might also lead to excessive investments in 
claims-processing bureaucracy, procedures or technology, raising insurers’ costs. 
This would, in turn, drive up the cost of insurance to consumers. 
  The extent of uncertainty facing many insurers is exacerbated by the fact that 
laws vary across the states. Insurers operating in more than one state must be 
cognizant of these varying standards and must adopt procedures and policies that 
can account for the variation. This might lead to additional resource expenditure 
and perhaps excessive caution if insurers adopt behaviors that are tailored to the 
most stringent state(s) in which they operate. 
  As this discussion suggests, assignment of excessive liability to insurers for 
bad faith might create significant distortions to the behavior of insurers and create 
unwarranted costs in insurance markets. These costs could be manifested as higher 
claims costs due to insurers’ reluctance to challenge disputable claims out of fear 
of liability, and/or as increases in insurer expenses due to increased investments in 
internal monitoring and legal expertise. If first-party bad-faith laws have these 
consequences, they will create inefficiencies in insurance markets and their 
benefits for insurance consumers will be lessened. 
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Empirical Evidence 
 
  While the impact of bad-faith law on insurance claim settlements has not been 
extensively studied, formal empirical analysis of first-party automobile insurance 
claims data has demonstrated that tort liability for insurer bad faith is associated 
with higher claims payments. Browne, Pryor and Puelz (2004) analyze a large 
dataset of first-party automobile insurance claims settled in 38 different states in 
1992.
18 They find that, even after controlling for a wide array of claim 
characteristics and for other features of states’ legal and claims environments, 
claim payments are significantly higher in states that allow tort actions for insurer 
bad faith in claims settlement. 
  Of course, higher claim payments should not be construed negatively if, in the 
absence of bad-faith liability, a tendency exists for insurers to underpay or to 
wrongfully deny claims. However, if higher claims payments are occurring 
because insurers are paying unwarranted amounts or paying illegitimate claims in 
order to avoid potential bad-faith liability, this should be a source of concern to 
policymakers. We are not aware of any empirical studies that consider the 
implications of first-party bad-faith laws for insurer claim-settlement behavior, but 
there is anecdotal evidence from case law that tort liability standards are too lax 
and/or damage awards are too high in some cases (Powers, 1994; Sykes, 1996). 
Therefore, we examine insurance claims data to begin to explore the relationship 
between tort-based first-party bad-faith liability and claim-settlement behaviors. 
  We use individual claims data from the Insurance Research Council (IRC) on 
uninsured motorist (UM) claims in automobile insurance. Uninsured motorist 
(UM) insurance is part of the private passenger automobile insurance policy and 
provides indemnification of medical expenses to the policyholder in accidents in 
which the driver who is at fault does not carry liability insurance. In this case, the 
injured policyholder files a UM claim with his own insurer and may receive 
compensation for both economic and non-economic losses. UM insurance is a 
first-party insurance contract and courts in a number of states have specifically 
upheld the applicability of first-party bad-faith remedies in the UM context 
(Browne, Pryor and Puelz, 2004).
19 
  The data are based on a national sampling of claims from insurance 
companies in 1997, the most recent year for which data are available to us. The 
original dataset includes nearly 6,000 uninsured motorist claims from 50 states, the 
District of Columbia and several U.S. territories. The survey reports a wealth of 
information for each claim, including the amount claimed and the amount paid; 
injury severity and type of injury; injury treatments; and the insurer’s handling of 
the claim. We combine these data on UM claims with data on each state’s legal 
                                                 
18. These authors study uninsured and underinsured motorist claims using data compiled by 
the Insurance Research Council from a 1992 survey of closed claims obtained from insurance 
companies. 
19. First-party underinsured motorist (UIM) claims were also separately analyzed, and the 
results were similar. 
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regime for insurer first-party bad faith to facilitate a comparison of outcomes 
among states with different bad-faith regimes. The data on state laws is compiled 
from the GenRe (2008) report on state bad-faith statutes. 
  Based on the discussion above, we are interested in two aspects of the claims: 
1) the use of investigative techniques by the insurer; and 2) characteristics of 
claims that might be indicative of fraud (so-called suspicion indicators or “red 
flags”). We provide evidence on each of these areas in turn by comparing mean 
(average) values of claim characteristics among states that have different legal 
regimes for first-party bad-faith actions.
20 
  We compare claims in states that allow tort-based causes of action for first-
party bad faith to claims in states that do not allow tort-based causes of action (but 
might allow contract-based or statute-based actions).
21 States are categorized into 
these two groups so that the important distinction between the two sets of states 
that are compared is whether the state allows unlimited punitive damages awards 
in bad-faith actions. That is, our comparisons are made for 1) states that permit 
tort-based first-party bad-faith actions vs. 2) states that do not (i.e., all other 
states). 
  For ease of presentation, we display the comparisons in graphical form (using 
bar charts). However, a more precise statistical comparison of means (averages) 
across the two sets of states is undertaken using a t-test. Statistical significance of 
the t-test depends both on how different the two means are, and how closely the 
mean of each group reflects the data for the individual states that are members of 
the group.
22 The larger is the difference in means across the groups, and the 
smaller is the difference in values across the states within each group, the more 
likely it is that the difference in means is statistically significant.
23 
 
                                                 
20. Because we recognize that claims characteristics might differ for small vs. large claims 
and that insurers might handle claims differently if they are of different size, we also undertook 
the comparisons shown in Exhibit 1 – Exhibit 5 for claims of roughly the same size (in the same 
quarter of the claims distribution). Results are comparable to those shown here. 
21. Although not shown here, results from comparing the two sets of states with the most 
disparate legal regimes (i.e., those that allow negligence-based torts vs. those that disallow all 
private actions) also reveal principally the same patterns. 
22. The t-test is also sensitive to the number of observations in each group, because larger 
numbers of observations make the results more reliable. 
23. Consider the case in which the average (mean) value of a variable across two different 
groups of states is different, but the values of that variable are widely dispersed for the individual 
states that are a member of each group. This dispersion across states within the group reduces the 
precision of the average in representing the states in the group. For this reason, the difference in 
means might not meet the standard of statistical significance. On the contrary, even if the average 
value of a variable does not appear to be very different across two comparison groups, the 
difference might, in fact, meet statistical significance if there is little dispersion within each 
group. Thus, while examining the raw magnitude of the difference in the mean values of 
variables across the two comparison sets of states might be informative, it is not sufficient to 
determine whether the difference is statistically significant. 
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Claim Investigations 
 
  Insurers have several methods at their disposal to investigate the validity of 
medical claims. One method is a medical audit, which entails having a medical 
professional (usually a nurse) review the medical treatment and bills submitted. 
The review will provide information from a medical perspective on whether the 
treatment and billed amounts are presumed to be appropriate. Another, more costly 
and detailed, investigative method is an independent medical exam (IME). An 
IME is an examination of the injured policyholder by a medical professional 
(usually a doctor) chosen by the insurance company. An IME provides a second 
medical opinion about the nature and severity of the injuries to the policyholder. 
An IME is more expensive than a medical audit and necessitates the cooperation 
and involvement of the policyholder. The IRC claims database reports information 
on whether a medical audit or an IME was undertaken for each claim.  
 
 
Exhibit 1: Claim Investigations in States with Different Bad-Faith Laws 
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Note: The difference across states in the use of medical audits is statistically significant, as 
is the difference across states in the use of IMEs. 
 
 
  Exhibit 1 compares insurers’ use of medical audits and IMEs, respectively, in 
states that allow tort-based actions for bad faith and states that do not. The 
comparisons show that insurers faced with potential tort actions are more likely to 
conduct a medical audit (on 39.5% of claims vs. 30% of claims in other states).  
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This difference across states is statistically significant, meaning that we can have a 
high degree of confidence that there truly are differences.
24 However, insurers 
request an IME for only 4.1% of claims in states that allow tort-based bad-faith 
actions, but for 14.8% of claims in states that do not allow tort-based bad-faith 
actions. T-test values show that this difference is also statistically significant. 
  These patterns are suggestive of larger resource investments in routine claims 
handling (medical audits) and smaller resource investments in fraud investigation 
(IMEs) by insurers in states that allow tort-based bad-faith actions. Because an 
IME requires the notification and cooperation of the insured, insurers might be 
particularly reluctant to undertake this type of investigation when bad-faith suits 
are decided under tort law.
25   
 
Fraud “Red Flags” 
 
  Fraudulent and exaggerated claims are an important problem in the insurance 
industry—and in automobile insurance, in particular. As a result, there is a 
growing empirical literature that analyzes the nature of claims fraud and how it is 
handled by insurance companies.
26 Particularly influential in this area are studies 
undertaken by Weisberg and Derrig (1991, 1998), in which insurance claims 
professionals were engaged to review actual closed-claim files in order to gauge 
the likelihood that each claim was legitimate or fraudulent. In addition to 
providing a suspicion score for each file, the reviewers were asked to list specific 
elements of the claims that led to a higher or lower degree of suspicion. One 
outcome of these studies is a catalog of fraud suspicion indicators, or “red flags,” 
defined as those elements of a claim that most claims professionals found to 
indicate potential fraud. The claim characteristics identified as suspicion indicators 
encompass a wide variety of characteristics of the insured, the accident, the injury 
and the injury treatment.  
  Several caveats should be emphasized regarding these indicators. First, these 
characteristics of a claim are not proof of fraud, but instead signal to the insurer 
that additional investigation might be needed. Second, no single characteristic 
should be thought to indicate potential fraud; instead, if enough of the 
characteristics are present in a claim, together these indicate a higher likelihood of 
fraud and, therefore, a need for additional investigation. 
  However, because the IRC database includes only claims that are closed with 
some payment by the insurer, we can make use of these suspicion indicators to 
infer whether insurers handle suspicious claims differently in states that allow tort-
                                                 
24. The statistical test employed is a t-test of differences in means across the two groups of 
states. Statistical significance is assessed at the 5% confidence level, 2-sided test. 
25. IMEs are more common in no-fault states. When no-fault states are examined 
separately, the difference in bad-faith regimes has this same effect, but there is no significant 
difference in IME use across the non-no-fault states with different bad-faith regimes. 
26. See Cummins and Tennyson (1992) and Abrahamsee and Carroll (1999) for evidence of 
the extent of the fraud problem in automobile insurance. Tennyson and Salsas-Forn (2002), 
Crocker and Tennyson (2002) and Loughran (2004) analyze claims handling by insurers. 
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based bad-faith actions as compared to states that do not. Specifically, if paid 
claims are more likely to exhibit fraud suspicion indicators in states that allow tort-
based bad faith, we might infer that insurers are less likely to deny suspicious 
claims in these states.  
  One fraud suspicion indicator is the lack of a police report for the accident 
that produced the claim. The thinking behind this is that in the normal course of an 
accident, the police will be called and a report will be filed. If there is no police 
report, it is more likely that the accident (and hence the injury) is fictitious. 
Another suspicion indicator is the lack of a visible injury at the scene of the 
accident. Although it is possible that the policyholder could realize his or her 
injuries only with some delay, if there was no injury apparent at the scene of the 
accident, it is more likely that the injury is fictitious or exaggerated. Exhibit 2 
compares these characteristics of claims across states with different bad-faith laws. 
 
 
Exhibit 2: Accident Characteristics in States with Different  
Bad-Faith Laws 
 
Characteristics at Scene of Accident
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Note: The differences across the states in the fraction of claims that have a police report and 
the fraction of claims that involve no visible injury are statistically significant. 
 
 
  We observe that police reports from the scene of the accident are less prevalent 
among claims in states that allow tort actions. In these states, 79.2% of claims have a 
police report from the scene of the accident, while 84.8% of claims in states that do 
not allow tort actions have an on-scene police report. In addition, we observe that 
claims involving no visible injury at the scene of the accident are more prevalent in 
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states that allow tort-based bad faith (70%) than in states that do not (62.4%). Tests 
show that these differences are statistically significant. Thus, suspicion indicators 
from the scene of the accident are more prevalent among paid claims in states that 
allow tort-based bad faith. This is consistent with the idea that insurers might be less 
likely to challenge disputable claims in states with these laws. 
  A second set of fraud suspicion indicators has to do with the nature of the 
injury. Soft-tissue injuries such as sprains and strains are difficult to medically 
verify and, therefore, fall into the category of claims that might not lend 
themselves to discovery through investigations (Dionne and St-Michele, 1991). As 
a result, they are notorious for being prone to falsification and exaggeration, and a 
claim involving only or primarily a sprain injury is a fraud suspicion indicator for 
insurers. Exhibit 3 compares the prevalence of sprain claims among states with 
different bad-faith laws.  
 
 
Exhibit 3: Characteristics of Injuries in States with Different Bad-Faith Laws 
 
Prevalence of Sprain Injuries
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Note: The differences across states in the fraction of claims involving a sprain and in the 
fraction of claims for which a sprain is the worst injury are statistically significant. 
 
 
  The exhibit reveals that paid claims in states that allow tort-based bad faith are 
more likely to involve a sprain injury (84.5% in states that allow tort-based bad 
faith, compared to 79.9% in states that do not), and more likely to involve a sprain 
as the most severe injury received by the policyholder (by 69.1% to 60.7%). Both 
of these differences are statistically significant. 
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  Appropriate treatment of sprain injuries is also difficult to determine, 
providing an additional avenue for a policyholder to falsify the treatment or to 
exaggerate the amount of treatment. Because of this, large numbers of visits to a 
chiropractor for treatment of accident injuries is another fraud suspicion indicator 
in the eyes of insurance claims professionals.  
 
Exhibit 4: Use of Chiropractors in States with Different Bad-Faith Laws 
 
Claimants' Use of Chiropractors
0.360
0.348
0.247
0.200
0.000
0.050
0.100
0.150
0.200
0.250
0.300
0.350
0.400
States that Permit Tort Actions All Other States
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
c
l
a
i
m
s
Any chiropractor visits
Chiropractor percent of claim
 
Note: The difference across states in the fraction of claims involving any chiropractor 
treatment is not statistically significant; however, the difference across states in the 
proportion of the total claim amount arising from chiropractor treatments is statistically 
significant. 
 
 
  Exhibit 4 shows that the fraction of claims with any chiropractor treatments is 
about the same among states with different bad-faith laws (36% in states that allow 
tort-based bad faith and 34.8% in states that do not), and the difference between 
the two sets of states is not statistically significant. However, the proportion of the 
total claimed amount that arises from chiropractor care is significantly larger in 
states that allow tort actions (24.7%) compared to states that do not (20%), and 
this difference is statistically significant. These differences in treatment patterns 
are suggestive of differences in insurers’ handling of claims that involve 
suspicious treatment patterns. 
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Exhibit 5: Disallowance of Claim Costs in States with Different  
Bad-Faith Laws 
Insurer Disallowance of Claimed Costs
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Note: The difference across states in the fraction of claims for which any costs were 
disallowed is not statistically significant, meaning that the difference might be due to 
random chance.  
 
 
  In light of the greater prevalence of fraud-suspicion indicators among claims 
in states that allow tort-based bad–faith actions, we examine the likelihood that 
some portion of the claim costs are disallowed by the insurer. Exhibit 5 compares 
the proportion of paid claims for which any charges were disallowed by the 
insurer, in states that allow tort-based bad faith and states that do not.  
  There is no statistically significant difference in the rate of disallowances 
among the two sets of states. This lack of difference, even as fraud-suspicion 
indicators are more prevalent in states with tort-based bad faith, suggests that 
insurers might be more reluctant to challenge claims when faced with tort liability.  
  Overall, Exhibits 1 through 5 provide a pattern of evidence: Paid UM claims 
in states that allow tort actions for insurer bad faith are significantly more likely to 
contain characteristics associated with claims fraud; but insurers in these states are 
not more aggressive in investigating claims or in disallowing part of the claimed 
costs.  
 
 
 
 
 
© 2009 National Association of Insurance Commissioners
18First-Party Insurance Bad-Faith Liability 
 
Conclusion 
  
  This paper has examined first-party insurance bad-faith remedies under 
common law and the recent legislative expansion of such remedies. Theory 
predicts that allowing policyholders to recover damages over and above the value 
of the insurance benefit owed will provide insurers with added incentives to 
engage in fair claims settlement, and that this might enhance the efficiency of 
contracting in insurance markets. However, theory also predicts that uncertain 
bad-faith standards for insurers and excessive damage awards for policyholders 
will undermine the benefits of the bad-faith remedy, distorting insurers’ claims-
settlement practices and policyholders’ claim-filing incentives in ways that will 
lead to more borderline (or even fraudulent) claims and unwarranted increases in 
insurance costs.  
  The paper presents empirical evidence that automobile UM claims in states 
that permit tort liability for first-party insurance bad faith are characterized by less 
intensive insurer investigations and more characteristics that are often associated 
with fraud. These patterns are consistent with the hypothesis that insurers might be 
inhibited in challenging disputable claims due to concerns about bad-faith liability. 
This could be one source of the higher claim costs in states that permit tort-based 
standards for insurer bad faith identified by previous research (Brown, Pryor and 
Puelz, 2004). If this is the case, policymakers should carefully consider whether 
the benefits of expanded bad-faith liability outweigh the costs of added uncertainty 
to insurers and the increased costs of insurance to consumers (Abraham, 2004). 
Further empirical research into insurance claims-settlement behaviors under 
different legal standards for bad faith would help to shed light on this question. 
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